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DTSTAMP:20241105T001427Z
SUMMARY:Daniel Berkowitz\, PhD\, University of Pittsburgh
DESCRIPTION: \n\n“What Makes Local Governments in Autocracies Accountable
 ?\n\nEvidence from China“\n\nhttps://www.lebow.drexel.edu/event/2022/11/
 04/daniel-berkowitz-phd-university-of-pittsburgh\n\nDaniel Berkowitz\, Uni
 versity of Pittsburgh\n\nYi Lu\, Tsinghua University\n\nMingqin Wu\, South
  China Normal University\n\nABSTRACT Authoritarian governments currently u
 se the internet and\nsocial media to monitor their lower-level government.
  Does “digital\nauthoritarianism” make local governments more accounta
 ble to their\nconstituents? Or does it breed rent seeking? Thus\, we explo
 it a policy\nexperiment where the Chinese central government required a su
 bset of\ntheir county governments to improve the communication links and d
 ata\non their public websites. Adjusting for non-random assignment of pilo
 t\ncounties\, selection on county leaders and a concurrent reform\, we fin
 d\nthat corruption fell and service provision increased in treated versus\
 ncontrol counties post-treatment. We argue that a plausible mechanism\nis 
 the website reform strengthened the promotion incentives of the\ncounty go
 vernment leaders (see Xiong\, 2020\, “the Mandarin Model of\nGrowth”).
  Consistent with this view\, in treated versus control\ncounties\, county 
 leaders were promoted more rapidly and\, county\ncitizens were energized b
 ecause they used social media platforms to\nsearch for information and pos
 t texts about the reform.\n 
DTSTART:20221104T180000Z
DTEND:20221104T193000Z
LOCATION:Gerri C. LeBow Hall\, 3220 Market Street\, 208\, Philadelphia\, PA
  19104
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